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Relying on the Metrics of Evaluated Agents

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Wang, Serena, Jordan, Michael I., Ligett, Katrina, McAfee, R. Preston
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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