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Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Jung, Jihyeok, Song, Chan-Oi, Lee, Deok-Joo, Yoon, Kiho
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory General Economics Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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