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Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Chen, Yurong, Chen, Zhaohua, Deng, Xiaotie, Huang, Zhiyi
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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