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Contract Design Beyond Hidden-Actions

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Ezra, Tomer, Leonardi, Stefano, Russo, Matteo
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2024
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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