Security of hybrid BB84 with heterodyne detection
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909120934707200 |
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| author | Sidhu, Jasminder S. Maggi, Rocco Pascazio, Saverio Lupo, Cosmo |
| author_facet | Sidhu, Jasminder S. Maggi, Rocco Pascazio, Saverio Lupo, Cosmo |
| contents | Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises everlasting security based on the laws of physics. Most common protocols are grouped into two distinct categories based on the degrees of freedom used to carry information, which can be either discrete or continuous, each presenting unique advantages in either performance, feasibility for near-term implementation, and compatibility with existing telecommunications architectures. Recently, hybrid QKD protocols have been introduced to leverage advantages from both categories. In this work we provide a rigorous security proof for a protocol introduced by Qi in 2021, where information is encoded in discrete variables as in the widespread Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol but decoded continuously via heterodyne detection. Security proofs for hybrid protocols inherit the same challenges associated with continuous-variable protocols due to unbounded dimensions. Here we successfully address these challenges by exploiting symmetry. Our approach enables truncation of the Hilbert space with precise control of the approximation errors and lead to a tight, semi-analytical expression for the asymptotic key rate under collective attacks. As concrete examples, we apply our theory to compute the key rates under passive attacks, linear loss, and Gaussian noise. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_16941 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Security of hybrid BB84 with heterodyne detection Sidhu, Jasminder S. Maggi, Rocco Pascazio, Saverio Lupo, Cosmo Quantum Physics Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises everlasting security based on the laws of physics. Most common protocols are grouped into two distinct categories based on the degrees of freedom used to carry information, which can be either discrete or continuous, each presenting unique advantages in either performance, feasibility for near-term implementation, and compatibility with existing telecommunications architectures. Recently, hybrid QKD protocols have been introduced to leverage advantages from both categories. In this work we provide a rigorous security proof for a protocol introduced by Qi in 2021, where information is encoded in discrete variables as in the widespread Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol but decoded continuously via heterodyne detection. Security proofs for hybrid protocols inherit the same challenges associated with continuous-variable protocols due to unbounded dimensions. Here we successfully address these challenges by exploiting symmetry. Our approach enables truncation of the Hilbert space with precise control of the approximation errors and lead to a tight, semi-analytical expression for the asymptotic key rate under collective attacks. As concrete examples, we apply our theory to compute the key rates under passive attacks, linear loss, and Gaussian noise. |
| title | Security of hybrid BB84 with heterodyne detection |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16941 |