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Multi-Parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Ezra, Tomer, Schoepflin, Daniel, Shaulker, Ariel
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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