When Your AIs Deceive You: Challenges of Partial Observability in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Lang, Leon, Foote, Davis, Russell, Stuart, Dragan, Anca, Jenner, Erik, Emmons, Scott
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Lang, Leon
Foote, Davis
Russell, Stuart
Dragan, Anca
Jenner, Erik
Emmons, Scott
author_facet Lang, Leon
Foote, Davis
Russell, Stuart
Dragan, Anca
Jenner, Erik
Emmons, Scott
contents Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human evaluators fully observe the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deceptive inflation and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. Under the new assumption that the human's partial observability is known and accounted for, we then analyze how much information the feedback process provides about the return function. We show that sometimes, the human's feedback determines the return function uniquely up to an additive constant, but in other realistic cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We propose exploratory research directions to help tackle these challenges, experimentally validate both the theoretical concerns and potential mitigations, and caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_17747
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle When Your AIs Deceive You: Challenges of Partial Observability in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
Lang, Leon
Foote, Davis
Russell, Stuart
Dragan, Anca
Jenner, Erik
Emmons, Scott
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human evaluators fully observe the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deceptive inflation and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. Under the new assumption that the human's partial observability is known and accounted for, we then analyze how much information the feedback process provides about the return function. We show that sometimes, the human's feedback determines the return function uniquely up to an additive constant, but in other realistic cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We propose exploratory research directions to help tackle these challenges, experimentally validate both the theoretical concerns and potential mitigations, and caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings.
title When Your AIs Deceive You: Challenges of Partial Observability in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.17747