Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Morison, Christo, Fic, Małgorzata, Marcou, Thomas, Mohamadichamgavi, Javad, Antón, Javier Redondo, Sayyar, Golsa, Stein, Alexander, Bastian, Frank, Krakovská, Hana, Krishnan, Nandakishor, Pires, Diogo L., Satouri, Mohammadreza, Thomsen, Frederik J., Tjikundi, Kausutua, Ali, Wajid
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Morison, Christo
Fic, Małgorzata
Marcou, Thomas
Mohamadichamgavi, Javad
Antón, Javier Redondo
Sayyar, Golsa
Stein, Alexander
Bastian, Frank
Krakovská, Hana
Krishnan, Nandakishor
Pires, Diogo L.
Satouri, Mohammadreza
Thomsen, Frederik J.
Tjikundi, Kausutua
Ali, Wajid
author_facet Morison, Christo
Fic, Małgorzata
Marcou, Thomas
Mohamadichamgavi, Javad
Antón, Javier Redondo
Sayyar, Golsa
Stein, Alexander
Bastian, Frank
Krakovská, Hana
Krishnan, Nandakishor
Pires, Diogo L.
Satouri, Mohammadreza
Thomsen, Frederik J.
Tjikundi, Kausutua
Ali, Wajid
contents Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, public goods games (PGGs) are used to analyse scenarios where individuals can cooperate or defect, and can predict when and how these behaviours emerge. However, too few examples motivate the transferal of knowledge from one application of PGGs to another. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review and compare. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_17842
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
Morison, Christo
Fic, Małgorzata
Marcou, Thomas
Mohamadichamgavi, Javad
Antón, Javier Redondo
Sayyar, Golsa
Stein, Alexander
Bastian, Frank
Krakovská, Hana
Krishnan, Nandakishor
Pires, Diogo L.
Satouri, Mohammadreza
Thomsen, Frederik J.
Tjikundi, Kausutua
Ali, Wajid
Populations and Evolution
Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, public goods games (PGGs) are used to analyse scenarios where individuals can cooperate or defect, and can predict when and how these behaviours emerge. However, too few examples motivate the transferal of knowledge from one application of PGGs to another. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review and compare. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.
title Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
topic Populations and Evolution
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.17842