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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.18516 |
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| _version_ | 1866913246781374464 |
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| author | Cestari, Raffaele Giuseppe Longari, Stefano Zanero, Stefano Formentin, Simone |
| author_facet | Cestari, Raffaele Giuseppe Longari, Stefano Zanero, Stefano Formentin, Simone |
| contents | In recent years, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems have increasingly become the target of cyber attacks. SCADAs are no longer isolated, as web-based applications expose strategic infrastructures to the outside world connection. In a cyber-warfare context, we propose a Model Predictive Control (MPC) architecture with adaptive resilience, capable of guaranteeing control performance in normal operating conditions and driving towards resilience against DoS (controller-actuator) attacks when needed. Since the attackers' goal is typically to maximize the system damage, we assume they solve an adversarial optimal control problem. An adaptive resilience factor is then designed as a function of the intensity function of a Hawkes process, a point process model estimating the occurrence of random events in time, trained on a moving window to estimate the return time of the next attack. We demonstrate the resulting MPC strategy's effectiveness in 2 attack scenarios on a real system with actual data, the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_18516 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Model Predictive Control with adaptive resilience for Denial-of-Service Attacks mitigation on a Regulated Dam Cestari, Raffaele Giuseppe Longari, Stefano Zanero, Stefano Formentin, Simone Systems and Control Cryptography and Security In recent years, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems have increasingly become the target of cyber attacks. SCADAs are no longer isolated, as web-based applications expose strategic infrastructures to the outside world connection. In a cyber-warfare context, we propose a Model Predictive Control (MPC) architecture with adaptive resilience, capable of guaranteeing control performance in normal operating conditions and driving towards resilience against DoS (controller-actuator) attacks when needed. Since the attackers' goal is typically to maximize the system damage, we assume they solve an adversarial optimal control problem. An adaptive resilience factor is then designed as a function of the intensity function of a Hawkes process, a point process model estimating the occurrence of random events in time, trained on a moving window to estimate the return time of the next attack. We demonstrate the resulting MPC strategy's effectiveness in 2 attack scenarios on a real system with actual data, the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como. |
| title | Model Predictive Control with adaptive resilience for Denial-of-Service Attacks mitigation on a Regulated Dam |
| topic | Systems and Control Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.18516 |