The Price of Opportunity Fairness in Matroid Allocation Problems
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Castera, Rémi Garrido-Lucero, Felipe Loiseau, Patrick Mauras, Simon Molina, Mathieu Perchet, Vianney |
| author_facet | Castera, Rémi Garrido-Lucero, Felipe Loiseau, Patrick Mauras, Simon Molina, Mathieu Perchet, Vianney |
| contents | We consider matroid allocation problems under opportunity fairness constraints: resources need to be allocated to a set of agents under matroid constraints (which include classical problems such as bipartite matching). Agents are divided into $C$ groups according to a sensitive attribute, and an allocation is opportunity-fair if each group receives the same share proportional to the maximum feasible allocation it could achieve in isolation. We study the Price of Fairness (PoF), i.e., the ratio between maximum size allocations and maximum size opportunity-fair allocations. We first provide a characterization of the PoF leveraging the underlying polymatroid structure of the allocation problem. Based on this characterization, we prove bounds on the PoF in various settings from fully adversarial (worst-case) to fully random. Notably, one of our main results considers an arbitrary matroid structure with agents randomly divided into groups. In this setting, we prove a PoF bound as a function of the (relative) size of the largest group. Our result implies that, as long as there is no dominant group (i.e., the largest group is not too large), opportunity fairness constraints do not induce any loss of social welfare (defined as the allocation size). Overall, our results give insights into which aspects of the problem's structure affect the trade-off between opportunity fairness and social welfare. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_00397 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Price of Opportunity Fairness in Matroid Allocation Problems Castera, Rémi Garrido-Lucero, Felipe Loiseau, Patrick Mauras, Simon Molina, Mathieu Perchet, Vianney Computer Science and Game Theory We consider matroid allocation problems under opportunity fairness constraints: resources need to be allocated to a set of agents under matroid constraints (which include classical problems such as bipartite matching). Agents are divided into $C$ groups according to a sensitive attribute, and an allocation is opportunity-fair if each group receives the same share proportional to the maximum feasible allocation it could achieve in isolation. We study the Price of Fairness (PoF), i.e., the ratio between maximum size allocations and maximum size opportunity-fair allocations. We first provide a characterization of the PoF leveraging the underlying polymatroid structure of the allocation problem. Based on this characterization, we prove bounds on the PoF in various settings from fully adversarial (worst-case) to fully random. Notably, one of our main results considers an arbitrary matroid structure with agents randomly divided into groups. In this setting, we prove a PoF bound as a function of the (relative) size of the largest group. Our result implies that, as long as there is no dominant group (i.e., the largest group is not too large), opportunity fairness constraints do not induce any loss of social welfare (defined as the allocation size). Overall, our results give insights into which aspects of the problem's structure affect the trade-off between opportunity fairness and social welfare. |
| title | The Price of Opportunity Fairness in Matroid Allocation Problems |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00397 |