As Soon as Possible but Rationally

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Bruyère, Véronique, Grandmont, Christophe, Raskin, Jean-François
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Bruyère, Véronique
Grandmont, Christophe
Raskin, Jean-François
author_facet Bruyère, Véronique
Grandmont, Christophe
Raskin, Jean-François
contents This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In these games, one player, referred to as the system, declares his strategy upfront. The other players, composing the environment, then rationally make their moves according to their objectives. The rational behavior of these responding players is captured through two models: they opt for strategies that either represent a Nash equilibrium or lead to a play with a Pareto-optimal cost tuple.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_00399
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle As Soon as Possible but Rationally
Bruyère, Véronique
Grandmont, Christophe
Raskin, Jean-François
Computer Science and Game Theory
This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In these games, one player, referred to as the system, declares his strategy upfront. The other players, composing the environment, then rationally make their moves according to their objectives. The rational behavior of these responding players is captured through two models: they opt for strategies that either represent a Nash equilibrium or lead to a play with a Pareto-optimal cost tuple.
title As Soon as Possible but Rationally
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00399