Teach LLMs to Phish: Stealing Private Information from Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Panda, Ashwinee, Choquette-Choo, Christopher A., Zhang, Zhengming, Yang, Yaoqing, Mittal, Prateek
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Panda, Ashwinee
Choquette-Choo, Christopher A.
Zhang, Zhengming
Yang, Yaoqing
Mittal, Prateek
author_facet Panda, Ashwinee
Choquette-Choo, Christopher A.
Zhang, Zhengming
Yang, Yaoqing
Mittal, Prateek
contents When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_00871
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Teach LLMs to Phish: Stealing Private Information from Language Models
Panda, Ashwinee
Choquette-Choo, Christopher A.
Zhang, Zhengming
Yang, Yaoqing
Mittal, Prateek
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Machine Learning
When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.
title Teach LLMs to Phish: Stealing Private Information from Language Models
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00871