Multiwinner Elections and the Spoiler Effect
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909129356869632 |
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| author | McCune, David Wilson, Jennifer |
| author_facet | McCune, David Wilson, Jennifer |
| contents | In the popular debate over the use of ranked-choice voting, it is often claimed that the method of single transferable vote (STV) is immune or mostly immune to the so-called ``spoiler effect,'' where the removal of a losing candidate changes the set of winners. This claim has previously been studied only in the single-winner case. We investigate how susceptible STV is to the spoiler effect in multiwinner elections, where the output of the voting method is a committee of size at least two. To evaluate STV we compare it to numerous other voting methods including single non-transferable vote, $k$-Borda, and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. We provide simulation results under three different random models and empirical results using a large database of real-world multiwinner political elections from Scotland. Our results show that STV is not spoiler-proof in any meaningful sense in the multiwinner context, but it tends to perform well relative to other methods, especially when using real-world ballot data. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_03228 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Multiwinner Elections and the Spoiler Effect McCune, David Wilson, Jennifer Methodology In the popular debate over the use of ranked-choice voting, it is often claimed that the method of single transferable vote (STV) is immune or mostly immune to the so-called ``spoiler effect,'' where the removal of a losing candidate changes the set of winners. This claim has previously been studied only in the single-winner case. We investigate how susceptible STV is to the spoiler effect in multiwinner elections, where the output of the voting method is a committee of size at least two. To evaluate STV we compare it to numerous other voting methods including single non-transferable vote, $k$-Borda, and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. We provide simulation results under three different random models and empirical results using a large database of real-world multiwinner political elections from Scotland. Our results show that STV is not spoiler-proof in any meaningful sense in the multiwinner context, but it tends to perform well relative to other methods, especially when using real-world ballot data. |
| title | Multiwinner Elections and the Spoiler Effect |
| topic | Methodology |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.03228 |