am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917919421628416 |
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| author | Adams, Austin Moallemi, Ciamac C. Reynolds, Sara Robinson, Dan |
| author_facet | Adams, Austin Moallemi, Ciamac C. Reynolds, Sara Robinson, Dan |
| contents | Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The ``auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as ``pool manager'' for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_03367 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker Adams, Austin Moallemi, Ciamac C. Reynolds, Sara Robinson, Dan Trading and Market Microstructure Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control Mathematical Finance Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The ``auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as ``pool manager'' for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM. |
| title | am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker |
| topic | Trading and Market Microstructure Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control Mathematical Finance |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.03367 |