Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04609 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866909131447730176 |
|---|---|
| author | Bansal, Rajni Kant Mallada, Enrique Hidalgo-Gonzalez, Patricia |
| author_facet | Bansal, Rajni Kant Mallada, Enrique Hidalgo-Gonzalez, Patricia |
| contents | Electricity markets typically clear in two stages: a day-ahead market and a real-time market. In this paper, we propose market mechanisms for a two-stage multi-interval electricity market with energy storage, generators, and demand uncertainties. We consider two possible mixed bidding strategies: storage first bids cycle depths in the day ahead and then charge-discharge power bids in the real-time market for any last-minute adjustments. While the first strategy only considers day-ahead decisions from an individual participant's perspective as part of their individual optimization formulation, the second strategy accounts for both the market operator's and participants' perspectives. We demonstrate that the competitive equilibrium exists uniquely for both mechanisms. However, accounting for the day-ahead decisions in the bidding function has several advantages. Numerical experiments using New York ISO data provide bounds on the proposed market mechanism. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_04609 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Market Mechanism for a Two-stage Settlement Electricity Market with Energy Storage Bansal, Rajni Kant Mallada, Enrique Hidalgo-Gonzalez, Patricia Optimization and Control Electricity markets typically clear in two stages: a day-ahead market and a real-time market. In this paper, we propose market mechanisms for a two-stage multi-interval electricity market with energy storage, generators, and demand uncertainties. We consider two possible mixed bidding strategies: storage first bids cycle depths in the day ahead and then charge-discharge power bids in the real-time market for any last-minute adjustments. While the first strategy only considers day-ahead decisions from an individual participant's perspective as part of their individual optimization formulation, the second strategy accounts for both the market operator's and participants' perspectives. We demonstrate that the competitive equilibrium exists uniquely for both mechanisms. However, accounting for the day-ahead decisions in the bidding function has several advantages. Numerical experiments using New York ISO data provide bounds on the proposed market mechanism. |
| title | A Market Mechanism for a Two-stage Settlement Electricity Market with Energy Storage |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04609 |