Seedless extractors for device-independent quantum cryptography
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910868542849024 |
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| author | Foreman, Cameron Masanes, Lluis |
| author_facet | Foreman, Cameron Masanes, Lluis |
| contents | Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography aims at providing secure cryptography with minimal trust in, or characterisation of, the underlying quantum devices. A key step in DI protocols is randomness extraction (or privacy amplification), which typically requires a \textit{seed} of additional bits with sufficient entropy and statistical independence from any bits generated during the protocol. In this work, we propose a method for extraction in DI protocols that does not require a seed and is secure against computationally unbounded quantum adversaries. The core idea is to use the Bell violation of the raw data, rather than its min-entropy, as the extractor promise. We present a complete security proof in a model where the experiment uses memoryless measurement devices acting on an arbitrary joint (across all rounds) state. Our results mark a first step in this alternative, seedless, approach to extraction in DI protocols. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_04713 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Seedless extractors for device-independent quantum cryptography Foreman, Cameron Masanes, Lluis Quantum Physics Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography aims at providing secure cryptography with minimal trust in, or characterisation of, the underlying quantum devices. A key step in DI protocols is randomness extraction (or privacy amplification), which typically requires a \textit{seed} of additional bits with sufficient entropy and statistical independence from any bits generated during the protocol. In this work, we propose a method for extraction in DI protocols that does not require a seed and is secure against computationally unbounded quantum adversaries. The core idea is to use the Bell violation of the raw data, rather than its min-entropy, as the extractor promise. We present a complete security proof in a model where the experiment uses memoryless measurement devices acting on an arbitrary joint (across all rounds) state. Our results mark a first step in this alternative, seedless, approach to extraction in DI protocols. |
| title | Seedless extractors for device-independent quantum cryptography |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04713 |