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Main Authors: Bojko, Marek, McAfee, Preston, Leme, Renato Paes, Sivan, Balasubramanian, Vassilvitskii, Sergei
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04856
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author Bojko, Marek
McAfee, Preston
Leme, Renato Paes
Sivan, Balasubramanian
Vassilvitskii, Sergei
author_facet Bojko, Marek
McAfee, Preston
Leme, Renato Paes
Sivan, Balasubramanian
Vassilvitskii, Sergei
contents We study revenue variance in the sale of $k$ homogeneous items to risk-neutral, unit-demand bidders with independent private values. Although the Revenue Equivalence Theorem implies that standard auctions generate the same expected revenue, the distribution of revenue differs across mechanisms. Prior work shows that, in single-item environments with ex-post individual rationality (IR), the first-price auction minimizes revenue variance. We show that this result is fragile. Under interim IR, the optimality of the first-price auction breaks down in asymmetric single-item settings, and we characterize the variance-minimizing mechanisms for any implementable allocation rule in this environment. In multi-item symmetric regular environments with interim IR, we construct a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation and guarantees constant revenue while maintaining non-negative payments. Under ex-post IR, we show that revenue variance can be reduced relative to winner-pays-bid formats by introducing negative correlations in payments. Nevertheless, we show that the variance ranking between the winner-pays-bid auction and the uniform $(k+1)$-st price auction is maintained in multi-unit settings.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_04856
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Revenue Variance Minimization: Beyond First Price Auctions
Bojko, Marek
McAfee, Preston
Leme, Renato Paes
Sivan, Balasubramanian
Vassilvitskii, Sergei
Computer Science and Game Theory
We study revenue variance in the sale of $k$ homogeneous items to risk-neutral, unit-demand bidders with independent private values. Although the Revenue Equivalence Theorem implies that standard auctions generate the same expected revenue, the distribution of revenue differs across mechanisms. Prior work shows that, in single-item environments with ex-post individual rationality (IR), the first-price auction minimizes revenue variance. We show that this result is fragile. Under interim IR, the optimality of the first-price auction breaks down in asymmetric single-item settings, and we characterize the variance-minimizing mechanisms for any implementable allocation rule in this environment. In multi-item symmetric regular environments with interim IR, we construct a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation and guarantees constant revenue while maintaining non-negative payments. Under ex-post IR, we show that revenue variance can be reduced relative to winner-pays-bid formats by introducing negative correlations in payments. Nevertheless, we show that the variance ranking between the winner-pays-bid auction and the uniform $(k+1)$-st price auction is maintained in multi-unit settings.
title Revenue Variance Minimization: Beyond First Price Auctions
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04856