Economic Capacity Withholding Bounds of Competitive Energy Storage Bidders
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866918022419054592 |
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| author | Qin, Xin Lestas, Ioannis Xu, Bolun |
| author_facet | Qin, Xin Lestas, Ioannis Xu, Bolun |
| contents | Economic withholding in electricity markets refers to generators bidding higher than their true marginal fuel cost, and is a typical approach to exercising market power. However, existing market designs require storage to design bids strategically based on their own future price predictions, motivating storage to conduct economic withholding without assuming market power. As energy storage takes up more significant roles in wholesale electricity markets, understanding its motivations for economic withholding and the consequent effects on social welfare becomes increasingly vital. This paper derives a theoretical framework to study the economic capacity withholding behavior of storage participating in competitive electricity markets and validate our results in simulations based on the ISO New England system. We demonstrate that storage bids can reach unbounded high levels under conditions where future price predictions show bounded expectations but unbounded deviations. Conversely, in scenarios with peak price limitations, we show the upper bounds of storage bids are grounded in bounded price expectations. Most importantly, we show that storage capacity withholding can potentially lower the overall system cost when price models account for system uncertainties. Our paper reveals energy storage is not a market manipulator but an honest player contributing to the social welfare. It helps electricity market researchers and operators better understand the economic withholding behavior of storage and reform market policies to maximize storage contributing to a cost-efficient decolonization. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_05705 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Economic Capacity Withholding Bounds of Competitive Energy Storage Bidders Qin, Xin Lestas, Ioannis Xu, Bolun Systems and Control Optimization and Control Economic withholding in electricity markets refers to generators bidding higher than their true marginal fuel cost, and is a typical approach to exercising market power. However, existing market designs require storage to design bids strategically based on their own future price predictions, motivating storage to conduct economic withholding without assuming market power. As energy storage takes up more significant roles in wholesale electricity markets, understanding its motivations for economic withholding and the consequent effects on social welfare becomes increasingly vital. This paper derives a theoretical framework to study the economic capacity withholding behavior of storage participating in competitive electricity markets and validate our results in simulations based on the ISO New England system. We demonstrate that storage bids can reach unbounded high levels under conditions where future price predictions show bounded expectations but unbounded deviations. Conversely, in scenarios with peak price limitations, we show the upper bounds of storage bids are grounded in bounded price expectations. Most importantly, we show that storage capacity withholding can potentially lower the overall system cost when price models account for system uncertainties. Our paper reveals energy storage is not a market manipulator but an honest player contributing to the social welfare. It helps electricity market researchers and operators better understand the economic withholding behavior of storage and reform market policies to maximize storage contributing to a cost-efficient decolonization. |
| title | Economic Capacity Withholding Bounds of Competitive Energy Storage Bidders |
| topic | Systems and Control Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.05705 |