Pre- and Post-Auction Discounts in First-Price Auctions
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866917610013065216 |
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| author | Alcobendas, Miguel Bax, Eric |
| author_facet | Alcobendas, Miguel Bax, Eric |
| contents | One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner, then charge them a discounted price that is lower than their bid should they win. We show that the two methods have equivalent auction outcomes, for equal additive discounts and for multiplicative ones with appropriate adjustments to discount amounts. As a result, they have corresponding equilibria when equilibria exist. We also show that with the same level of multiplicative adjustments, bidders with discounts should prefer an augmented bid to a discounted price. Then we estimate optimal bid functions for valuation distributions based on data from online advertising auctions, and show how different discount levels affect auction outcomes for those bid functions. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_06278 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Pre- and Post-Auction Discounts in First-Price Auctions Alcobendas, Miguel Bax, Eric Computer Science and Game Theory One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner, then charge them a discounted price that is lower than their bid should they win. We show that the two methods have equivalent auction outcomes, for equal additive discounts and for multiplicative ones with appropriate adjustments to discount amounts. As a result, they have corresponding equilibria when equilibria exist. We also show that with the same level of multiplicative adjustments, bidders with discounts should prefer an augmented bid to a discounted price. Then we estimate optimal bid functions for valuation distributions based on data from online advertising auctions, and show how different discount levels affect auction outcomes for those bid functions. |
| title | Pre- and Post-Auction Discounts in First-Price Auctions |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.06278 |