Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866911792816455680 |
|---|---|
| author | Montero-Porras, Eladio Suchon, Rémi Lenaerts, Tom Domingos, Elias Fernández |
| author_facet | Montero-Porras, Eladio Suchon, Rémi Lenaerts, Tom Domingos, Elias Fernández |
| contents | Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. Participants were exposed to two treatments -- pro-social or self-serving extraction defaults -- and a control without defaults. We examined the persistence of these nudges by removing the default after five rounds. Results reveal that a self-serving default increased the average extraction while present, whereas a pro-social default only decreased extraction for the first two rounds. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under a self-serving default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. After the removal of the default, we observed no significant differences with the control treatment. Our research highlights the potential of defaults as cost-effective tools for promoting sustainability, while also advocating for a careful use to avoid adverse effects. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_06796 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources Montero-Porras, Eladio Suchon, Rémi Lenaerts, Tom Domingos, Elias Fernández Computer Science and Game Theory Computers and Society Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. Participants were exposed to two treatments -- pro-social or self-serving extraction defaults -- and a control without defaults. We examined the persistence of these nudges by removing the default after five rounds. Results reveal that a self-serving default increased the average extraction while present, whereas a pro-social default only decreased extraction for the first two rounds. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under a self-serving default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. After the removal of the default, we observed no significant differences with the control treatment. Our research highlights the potential of defaults as cost-effective tools for promoting sustainability, while also advocating for a careful use to avoid adverse effects. |
| title | Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.06796 |