Success functions in large contests
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909193364045824 |
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| author | Azrieli, Yaron Chambers, Christopher P. |
| author_facet | Azrieli, Yaron Chambers, Christopher P. |
| contents | We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by a market clearing condition. A co-monotonicity property is essentially all that is needed for a representation in the general case, but significantly stronger conditions must hold to obtain an additive structure. We illustrate the usefulness of this framework by revisiting some of the classic questions in the contests literature. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_07152 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Success functions in large contests Azrieli, Yaron Chambers, Christopher P. Theoretical Economics We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by a market clearing condition. A co-monotonicity property is essentially all that is needed for a representation in the general case, but significantly stronger conditions must hold to obtain an additive structure. We illustrate the usefulness of this framework by revisiting some of the classic questions in the contests literature. |
| title | Success functions in large contests |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07152 |