Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913532837101568 |
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| author | Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri Inamdar, Tanmay Jain, Pallavi More, Yash Talmon, Nimrod |
| author_facet | Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri Inamdar, Tanmay Jain, Pallavi More, Yash Talmon, Nimrod |
| contents | In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_07558 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri Inamdar, Tanmay Jain, Pallavi More, Yash Talmon, Nimrod Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem. |
| title | Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07558 |