51% Attack via Difficulty Increase with a Small Quantum Miner
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914960462839808 |
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| author | Bailey, Bolton Sattath, Or |
| author_facet | Bailey, Bolton Sattath, Or |
| contents | We present a strategy for a single quantum miner with relatively low hashing power, with the same ramifications as a 51% attack. Bitcoin nodes consider the chain with the highest cumulative proof-of-work to be the valid chain. A quantum miner can manipulate the block timestamps to multiply the difficulty by $c$. The fork-choice rule counts every block with increased difficulty with weight $c$. By using Grover's algorithm, it is only $O(\sqrt c)$ harder for the quantum miner to mine such blocks. By picking a high enough $c$, the single quantum miner can create a competing chain with fewer blocks, but more cumulative proof-of-work. The time required is $O(\frac{1}{r^2})$ epochs, where $r$ is the fraction of the block rewards that the quantum miner would have received if they mined honestly.
Most proof-of-work cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, are vulnerable to our attack. However, it will likely be impossible to execute in forthcoming years, as it requires an extremely fast and fault-tolerant quantum computer. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_08023 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | 51% Attack via Difficulty Increase with a Small Quantum Miner Bailey, Bolton Sattath, Or Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security We present a strategy for a single quantum miner with relatively low hashing power, with the same ramifications as a 51% attack. Bitcoin nodes consider the chain with the highest cumulative proof-of-work to be the valid chain. A quantum miner can manipulate the block timestamps to multiply the difficulty by $c$. The fork-choice rule counts every block with increased difficulty with weight $c$. By using Grover's algorithm, it is only $O(\sqrt c)$ harder for the quantum miner to mine such blocks. By picking a high enough $c$, the single quantum miner can create a competing chain with fewer blocks, but more cumulative proof-of-work. The time required is $O(\frac{1}{r^2})$ epochs, where $r$ is the fraction of the block rewards that the quantum miner would have received if they mined honestly. Most proof-of-work cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, are vulnerable to our attack. However, it will likely be impossible to execute in forthcoming years, as it requires an extremely fast and fault-tolerant quantum computer. |
| title | 51% Attack via Difficulty Increase with a Small Quantum Miner |
| topic | Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.08023 |