Tournament Auctions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916157544464384 |
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| author | Anderlini, Luca Kim, GaOn |
| author_facet | Anderlini, Luca Kim, GaOn |
| contents | We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in the second stage, the analysis yields some unexpected results. The first $N$ bidders consistently bid above their values in equilibrium. When bidder $N+1$ is sufficiently stronger than the first $N$, overbidding leads to an increase in expected revenue in comparison to the standard second-price auction when $N$ is large. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_08102 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Tournament Auctions Anderlini, Luca Kim, GaOn Theoretical Economics We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in the second stage, the analysis yields some unexpected results. The first $N$ bidders consistently bid above their values in equilibrium. When bidder $N+1$ is sufficiently stronger than the first $N$, overbidding leads to an increase in expected revenue in comparison to the standard second-price auction when $N$ is large. |
| title | Tournament Auctions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.08102 |