Physical Memory Attacks and a Memory Safe Management System for Memory Defense

Fuente: arXiv
Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Hillel-Tuch, Alon, Olmstead, Aspen
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:
Tags: Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
_version_ 1866918303896698880
author Hillel-Tuch, Alon
Olmstead, Aspen
author_facet Hillel-Tuch, Alon
Olmstead, Aspen
contents Programming errors, defective hardware components (such as hard disk spindle defects), and environmental hazards can lead to invalid memory operations. In addition, less predictable forms of environmental stress, such as radiation, thermal influence, and energy fluctuations, can induce hardware faults. Sometimes, a soft error can occur instead of a complete failure, such as a bit-flip. The 'natural' factors that can cause bit-flips are replicable through targeted attacks that result in significant compromises, including full privileged system access. Existing physical defense solutions have consistently been circumvented shortly after deployment. We will explore the concept of a novel software-based low-level layer that can protect vulnerable memory targeted by physical attack vectors related to bit-flip vulnerabilities.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_08656
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Physical Memory Attacks and a Memory Safe Management System for Memory Defense
Hillel-Tuch, Alon
Olmstead, Aspen
Cryptography and Security
Operating Systems
Programming errors, defective hardware components (such as hard disk spindle defects), and environmental hazards can lead to invalid memory operations. In addition, less predictable forms of environmental stress, such as radiation, thermal influence, and energy fluctuations, can induce hardware faults. Sometimes, a soft error can occur instead of a complete failure, such as a bit-flip. The 'natural' factors that can cause bit-flips are replicable through targeted attacks that result in significant compromises, including full privileged system access. Existing physical defense solutions have consistently been circumvented shortly after deployment. We will explore the concept of a novel software-based low-level layer that can protect vulnerable memory targeted by physical attack vectors related to bit-flip vulnerabilities.
title Physical Memory Attacks and a Memory Safe Management System for Memory Defense
topic Cryptography and Security
Operating Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.08656