Subgame Optimal and Prior-Independent Online Algorithms

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Hartline, Jason, Johnsen, Aleck, Shah, Anant
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Hartline, Jason
Johnsen, Aleck
Shah, Anant
author_facet Hartline, Jason
Johnsen, Aleck
Shah, Anant
contents This paper takes a game theoretic approach to the design and analysis of online algorithms and illustrates the approach on the finite-horizon ski-rental problem. This approach allows beyond worst-case analysis of online algorithms. First, we define "subgame optimality" which is stronger than worst case optimality in that it requires the algorithm to take advantage of an adversary not playing a worst case input. Algorithms only focusing on the worst case can be far from subgame optimal. Second, we consider prior-independent design and analysis of online algorithms, where rather than choosing a worst case input, the adversary chooses a worst case independent and identical distribution over inputs. Prior-independent online algorithms are generally analytically intractable; instead we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme to compute them. Highlighting the potential improvement from these paradigms for the finite-horizon ski-rental problem, we empirically compare worst-case, subgame optimal, and prior-independent algorithms in the prior-independent framework.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_10451
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Subgame Optimal and Prior-Independent Online Algorithms
Hartline, Jason
Johnsen, Aleck
Shah, Anant
Computer Science and Game Theory
This paper takes a game theoretic approach to the design and analysis of online algorithms and illustrates the approach on the finite-horizon ski-rental problem. This approach allows beyond worst-case analysis of online algorithms. First, we define "subgame optimality" which is stronger than worst case optimality in that it requires the algorithm to take advantage of an adversary not playing a worst case input. Algorithms only focusing on the worst case can be far from subgame optimal. Second, we consider prior-independent design and analysis of online algorithms, where rather than choosing a worst case input, the adversary chooses a worst case independent and identical distribution over inputs. Prior-independent online algorithms are generally analytically intractable; instead we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme to compute them. Highlighting the potential improvement from these paradigms for the finite-horizon ski-rental problem, we empirically compare worst-case, subgame optimal, and prior-independent algorithms in the prior-independent framework.
title Subgame Optimal and Prior-Independent Online Algorithms
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.10451