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MAC Advice for Facility Location Mechanism Design

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Barak, Zohar, Gupta, Anupam, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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