Parasitic Circus:On the Feasibility of Golden Free PCB Verification
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866916164271079424 |
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| author | Safa, Maryam Saadat Schaumont, Patrick Tajik, Shahin |
| author_facet | Safa, Maryam Saadat Schaumont, Patrick Tajik, Shahin |
| contents | Printed circuit boards (PCBs) are an integral part of electronic systems. Hence, verifying their physical integrity in the presence of supply chain attacks (e.g., tampering and counterfeiting) is of utmost importance. Recently, tamper detection techniques grounded in impedance characterization of PCB's Power Delivery Network (PDN) have gained prominence due to their global detection coverage, non-invasive, and low-cost nature. Similar to other physical verification methods, these techniques rely on the existence of a physical golden sample for signature comparisons. However, having access to a physical golden sample for golden signature extraction is not feasible in many real-world scenarios. In this work, we assess the feasibility of eliminating a physical golden sample and replacing it with a simulated golden signature obtained by the PCB design files. By performing extensive simulation and measurements on an in-house designed PCB, we demonstrate how the parasitic impedance of the PCB components plays a major role in reaching a successful verification. Based on the obtained results and using statistical metrics, we show that we can mitigate the discrepancy between collected signatures from simulation and measurements. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_12252 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Parasitic Circus:On the Feasibility of Golden Free PCB Verification Safa, Maryam Saadat Schaumont, Patrick Tajik, Shahin Cryptography and Security Printed circuit boards (PCBs) are an integral part of electronic systems. Hence, verifying their physical integrity in the presence of supply chain attacks (e.g., tampering and counterfeiting) is of utmost importance. Recently, tamper detection techniques grounded in impedance characterization of PCB's Power Delivery Network (PDN) have gained prominence due to their global detection coverage, non-invasive, and low-cost nature. Similar to other physical verification methods, these techniques rely on the existence of a physical golden sample for signature comparisons. However, having access to a physical golden sample for golden signature extraction is not feasible in many real-world scenarios. In this work, we assess the feasibility of eliminating a physical golden sample and replacing it with a simulated golden signature obtained by the PCB design files. By performing extensive simulation and measurements on an in-house designed PCB, we demonstrate how the parasitic impedance of the PCB components plays a major role in reaching a successful verification. Based on the obtained results and using statistical metrics, we show that we can mitigate the discrepancy between collected signatures from simulation and measurements. |
| title | Parasitic Circus:On the Feasibility of Golden Free PCB Verification |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.12252 |