A Secure Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Using Two-Particle Transmission

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Bej, Pratapaditya, Jayakeerthi, Vinod
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866909167608922112
author Bej, Pratapaditya
Jayakeerthi, Vinod
author_facet Bej, Pratapaditya
Jayakeerthi, Vinod
contents The evolution of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) relies on innovative methods to enhance its security and efficiency. Unextendible Product Bases (UPBs) hold promise in quantum cryptography due to their inherent indistinguishability, yet they are underutilized in QKD protocols. This work introduces a protocol utilizing UPBs to establish quantum keys between distant parties. Specifically, we propose a protocol utilizing a $3\times 3$ tile UPB, where Alice sequentially transmits subsystem states to Bob through quantum channels. The protocol's security is underpinned by the no-cloning theorem, prohibiting the cloning of orthogonal states. We analyze potential attacks, including intercept-resend and detector blinding attacks when quantum channels are noiseless, and discuss the challenges posed by the indistinguishability of our protocol for eavesdroppers, thereby enhancing QKD security.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_13634
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A Secure Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Using Two-Particle Transmission
Bej, Pratapaditya
Jayakeerthi, Vinod
Quantum Physics
The evolution of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) relies on innovative methods to enhance its security and efficiency. Unextendible Product Bases (UPBs) hold promise in quantum cryptography due to their inherent indistinguishability, yet they are underutilized in QKD protocols. This work introduces a protocol utilizing UPBs to establish quantum keys between distant parties. Specifically, we propose a protocol utilizing a $3\times 3$ tile UPB, where Alice sequentially transmits subsystem states to Bob through quantum channels. The protocol's security is underpinned by the no-cloning theorem, prohibiting the cloning of orthogonal states. We analyze potential attacks, including intercept-resend and detector blinding attacks when quantum channels are noiseless, and discuss the challenges posed by the indistinguishability of our protocol for eavesdroppers, thereby enhancing QKD security.
title A Secure Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Using Two-Particle Transmission
topic Quantum Physics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.13634