Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly Independent Preferences
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914722561916928 |
|---|---|
| author | Barton, Alistair |
| author_facet | Barton, Alistair |
| contents | We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences -- contrary to prior research establishing persuasive equilibria when the sender's preference is precisely transparent.
Nevertheless, robust persuasion may occur when the sender's preference is only slightly state-dependent/idiosyncratic. This requires approximating an `acyclic' equilibrium of the transparent preference game, generically implying that this equilibrium is also `connected' -- a generalization of partial-pooling equilibria. It is then necessary and sufficient that the sender's preference satisfy a monotonicity condition relative to the approximated equilibrium.
If the sender's preference further satisfies a `semi-local' version of increasing differences, then this analysis extends to sender preferences that rank pure actions (but not mixed actions) according to a state-independent order.
We apply these techniques to study (1) how ethical considerations, such as empathy for the receiver, may improve or impede comm |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_13983 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly Independent Preferences Barton, Alistair Theoretical Economics 91A28 (primary), 91B03 (secondary) We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences -- contrary to prior research establishing persuasive equilibria when the sender's preference is precisely transparent. Nevertheless, robust persuasion may occur when the sender's preference is only slightly state-dependent/idiosyncratic. This requires approximating an `acyclic' equilibrium of the transparent preference game, generically implying that this equilibrium is also `connected' -- a generalization of partial-pooling equilibria. It is then necessary and sufficient that the sender's preference satisfy a monotonicity condition relative to the approximated equilibrium. If the sender's preference further satisfies a `semi-local' version of increasing differences, then this analysis extends to sender preferences that rank pure actions (but not mixed actions) according to a state-independent order. We apply these techniques to study (1) how ethical considerations, such as empathy for the receiver, may improve or impede comm |
| title | Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly Independent Preferences |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91A28 (primary), 91B03 (secondary) |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.13983 |