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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14020 |
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| _version_ | 1866913340897361920 |
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| author | Tao, Ye Wu, Hongyi Javanmardi, Ehsan Tsukada, Manabu Esaki, Hiroshi |
| author_facet | Tao, Ye Wu, Hongyi Javanmardi, Ehsan Tsukada, Manabu Esaki, Hiroshi |
| contents | Pseudonyms are widely used in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) to protect the location privacy of vehicles. However, the unlinkability nature of pseudonyms also enables Sybil attacks, where a malicious vehicle can pretend to be multiple vehicles at the same time. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol called zero-knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity (zk-PoDI,) which allows a vehicle to prove that it is not the owner of another pseudonym in the local area, without revealing its actual identity. Zk-PoDI is based on the Diophantine equation and zk-SNARK, and does not rely on any specific pseudonym design or infrastructure assistance. We show that zk-PoDI satisfies all the requirements for a practical Sybil-resistance pseudonym system, and it has low latency, adjustable difficulty, moderate computation overhead, and negligible communication cost. We also discuss the future work of implementing and evaluating zk-PoDI in a realistic city-scale simulation environment. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_14020 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Zero-Knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity: a Standard-compatible Sybil-resistant Pseudonym Extension for C-ITS Tao, Ye Wu, Hongyi Javanmardi, Ehsan Tsukada, Manabu Esaki, Hiroshi Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture Pseudonyms are widely used in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) to protect the location privacy of vehicles. However, the unlinkability nature of pseudonyms also enables Sybil attacks, where a malicious vehicle can pretend to be multiple vehicles at the same time. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol called zero-knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity (zk-PoDI,) which allows a vehicle to prove that it is not the owner of another pseudonym in the local area, without revealing its actual identity. Zk-PoDI is based on the Diophantine equation and zk-SNARK, and does not rely on any specific pseudonym design or infrastructure assistance. We show that zk-PoDI satisfies all the requirements for a practical Sybil-resistance pseudonym system, and it has low latency, adjustable difficulty, moderate computation overhead, and negligible communication cost. We also discuss the future work of implementing and evaluating zk-PoDI in a realistic city-scale simulation environment. |
| title | Zero-Knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity: a Standard-compatible Sybil-resistant Pseudonym Extension for C-ITS |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14020 |