Clarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866918464687439872 |
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| author | Pohl, Stephan Walker, Edgar Y. Barack, David L. Lee, Jennifer Denison, Rachel N. Block, Ned Meyniel, Florent Ma, Wei Ji |
| author_facet | Pohl, Stephan Walker, Edgar Y. Barack, David L. Lee, Jennifer Denison, Rachel N. Block, Ned Meyniel, Florent Ma, Wei Ji |
| contents | Despite the centrality of the notion of representation in neuroscience, the field lacks a unified framework for the concepts used to characterize representation, leading to disparate use of both terminology and measures associated with it. To offer clarification, we propose a core set of conceptual dimensions that characterize representations in neuroscience. These dimensions describe relations between a neural response, features that may be represented, and downstream effects of the neural response. A neural response may be shown to be sensitive or specific to a feature, invariant to other features, or functional (it is used downstream in the brain). We use information-theoretic measures to illustrate these conceptual dimensions and explain how they relate to data analysis methods such as correlational analyses, decoding and encoding models, representational similarity analysis, and tests of statistical dependence or adaptation. We consider several canonical examples, including models of the representation of orientation, numerosity, and spatial location, which illustrate how the evidence put forth in support or criticism of these models is systematized by our framework. By offering a unified conceptual framework to characterize representation in neuroscience, we hope to aid the comparison and integration of results across studies and research groups and to help determine when evidence for a neural representation is strong. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_14046 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Clarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience Pohl, Stephan Walker, Edgar Y. Barack, David L. Lee, Jennifer Denison, Rachel N. Block, Ned Meyniel, Florent Ma, Wei Ji Neurons and Cognition Despite the centrality of the notion of representation in neuroscience, the field lacks a unified framework for the concepts used to characterize representation, leading to disparate use of both terminology and measures associated with it. To offer clarification, we propose a core set of conceptual dimensions that characterize representations in neuroscience. These dimensions describe relations between a neural response, features that may be represented, and downstream effects of the neural response. A neural response may be shown to be sensitive or specific to a feature, invariant to other features, or functional (it is used downstream in the brain). We use information-theoretic measures to illustrate these conceptual dimensions and explain how they relate to data analysis methods such as correlational analyses, decoding and encoding models, representational similarity analysis, and tests of statistical dependence or adaptation. We consider several canonical examples, including models of the representation of orientation, numerosity, and spatial location, which illustrate how the evidence put forth in support or criticism of these models is systematized by our framework. By offering a unified conceptual framework to characterize representation in neuroscience, we hope to aid the comparison and integration of results across studies and research groups and to help determine when evidence for a neural representation is strong. |
| title | Clarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience |
| topic | Neurons and Cognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14046 |