Subspace Defense: Discarding Adversarial Perturbations by Learning a Subspace for Clean Signals

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Zheng, Rui, Zhou, Yuhao, Xi, Zhiheng, Gui, Tao, Zhang, Qi, Huang, Xuanjing
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Zheng, Rui
Zhou, Yuhao
Xi, Zhiheng
Gui, Tao
Zhang, Qi
Huang, Xuanjing
author_facet Zheng, Rui
Zhou, Yuhao
Xi, Zhiheng
Gui, Tao
Zhang, Qi
Huang, Xuanjing
contents Deep neural networks (DNNs) are notoriously vulnerable to adversarial attacks that place carefully crafted perturbations on normal examples to fool DNNs. To better understand such attacks, a characterization of the features carried by adversarial examples is needed. In this paper, we tackle this challenge by inspecting the subspaces of sample features through spectral analysis. We first empirically show that the features of either clean signals or adversarial perturbations are redundant and span in low-dimensional linear subspaces respectively with minimal overlap, and the classical low-dimensional subspace projection can suppress perturbation features out of the subspace of clean signals. This makes it possible for DNNs to learn a subspace where only features of clean signals exist while those of perturbations are discarded, which can facilitate the distinction of adversarial examples. To prevent the residual perturbations that is inevitable in subspace learning, we propose an independence criterion to disentangle clean signals from perturbations. Experimental results show that the proposed strategy enables the model to inherently suppress adversaries, which not only boosts model robustness but also motivates new directions of effective adversarial defense.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_16176
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Subspace Defense: Discarding Adversarial Perturbations by Learning a Subspace for Clean Signals
Zheng, Rui
Zhou, Yuhao
Xi, Zhiheng
Gui, Tao
Zhang, Qi
Huang, Xuanjing
Machine Learning
Computation and Language
Cryptography and Security
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are notoriously vulnerable to adversarial attacks that place carefully crafted perturbations on normal examples to fool DNNs. To better understand such attacks, a characterization of the features carried by adversarial examples is needed. In this paper, we tackle this challenge by inspecting the subspaces of sample features through spectral analysis. We first empirically show that the features of either clean signals or adversarial perturbations are redundant and span in low-dimensional linear subspaces respectively with minimal overlap, and the classical low-dimensional subspace projection can suppress perturbation features out of the subspace of clean signals. This makes it possible for DNNs to learn a subspace where only features of clean signals exist while those of perturbations are discarded, which can facilitate the distinction of adversarial examples. To prevent the residual perturbations that is inevitable in subspace learning, we propose an independence criterion to disentangle clean signals from perturbations. Experimental results show that the proposed strategy enables the model to inherently suppress adversaries, which not only boosts model robustness but also motivates new directions of effective adversarial defense.
title Subspace Defense: Discarding Adversarial Perturbations by Learning a Subspace for Clean Signals
topic Machine Learning
Computation and Language
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16176