Social Deliberation vs. Social Contracts in Self-Governing Voluntary Organisations
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913281597243392 |
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| author | Scott, Matthew Mertzani, Asimina Smit, Ciske Sarkadi, Stefan Pitt, Jeremy |
| author_facet | Scott, Matthew Mertzani, Asimina Smit, Ciske Sarkadi, Stefan Pitt, Jeremy |
| contents | Self-organising multi-agent systems regulate their components' behaviour voluntarily, according to a set of socially-constructed, mutually-agreed, and mutable social arrangements. In some systems, these arrangements may be applied with a frequency, at a scale and within implicit cost constraints such that performance becomes a pressing issue. This paper introduces the \textit{Megabike Scenario}, which consists of a negotiated agreement on a relatively 'large' set of conventional rules, 'frequent' 'democratic' decision-making according to those rules, and a resource-bounded imperative to reach 'correct' decisions. A formalism is defined for effective rule representation and processing in the scenario, and is evaluated against five interleaved socio-functional requirements. System performance is also evaluated empirically through simulation. We conclude that to self-organise their social arrangements, agents need some awareness of their own limitations and the value of compromise. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_16329 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Social Deliberation vs. Social Contracts in Self-Governing Voluntary Organisations Scott, Matthew Mertzani, Asimina Smit, Ciske Sarkadi, Stefan Pitt, Jeremy Multiagent Systems I.2.11 Self-organising multi-agent systems regulate their components' behaviour voluntarily, according to a set of socially-constructed, mutually-agreed, and mutable social arrangements. In some systems, these arrangements may be applied with a frequency, at a scale and within implicit cost constraints such that performance becomes a pressing issue. This paper introduces the \textit{Megabike Scenario}, which consists of a negotiated agreement on a relatively 'large' set of conventional rules, 'frequent' 'democratic' decision-making according to those rules, and a resource-bounded imperative to reach 'correct' decisions. A formalism is defined for effective rule representation and processing in the scenario, and is evaluated against five interleaved socio-functional requirements. System performance is also evaluated empirically through simulation. We conclude that to self-organise their social arrangements, agents need some awareness of their own limitations and the value of compromise. |
| title | Social Deliberation vs. Social Contracts in Self-Governing Voluntary Organisations |
| topic | Multiagent Systems I.2.11 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16329 |