Paths to Equilibrium in Games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916418435416064 |
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| author | Yongacoglu, Bora Arslan, Gürdal Pavel, Lacra Yüksel, Serdar |
| author_facet | Yongacoglu, Bora Arslan, Gürdal Pavel, Lacra Yüksel, Serdar |
| contents | In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a pairwise constraint inspired by policy updating in reinforcement learning, where an agent who is best responding in one period does not switch its strategy in the next period. This constraint merely requires that optimizing agents do not switch strategies, but does not constrain the non-optimizing agents in any way, and thus allows for exploration. Sequences with this property are called satisficing paths, and arise naturally in many MARL algorithms. A fundamental question about strategic dynamics is such: for a given game and initial strategy profile, is it always possible to construct a satisficing path that terminates at an equilibrium? The resolution of this question has implications about the capabilities or limitations of a class of MARL algorithms. We answer this question in the affirmative for normal-form games. Our analysis reveals a counterintuitive insight that reward deteriorating strategic updates are key to driving play to equilibrium along a satisficing path. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_18079 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Paths to Equilibrium in Games Yongacoglu, Bora Arslan, Gürdal Pavel, Lacra Yüksel, Serdar Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a pairwise constraint inspired by policy updating in reinforcement learning, where an agent who is best responding in one period does not switch its strategy in the next period. This constraint merely requires that optimizing agents do not switch strategies, but does not constrain the non-optimizing agents in any way, and thus allows for exploration. Sequences with this property are called satisficing paths, and arise naturally in many MARL algorithms. A fundamental question about strategic dynamics is such: for a given game and initial strategy profile, is it always possible to construct a satisficing path that terminates at an equilibrium? The resolution of this question has implications about the capabilities or limitations of a class of MARL algorithms. We answer this question in the affirmative for normal-form games. Our analysis reveals a counterintuitive insight that reward deteriorating strategic updates are key to driving play to equilibrium along a satisficing path. |
| title | Paths to Equilibrium in Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.18079 |