Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917791419858944 |
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| author | Su, Pan-Yang Maheshwari, Chinmay Tuck, Victoria Sastry, Shankar |
| author_facet | Su, Pan-Yang Maheshwari, Chinmay Tuck, Victoria Sastry, Shankar |
| contents | The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports. Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that leverages the network flow structure. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_18166 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach Su, Pan-Yang Maheshwari, Chinmay Tuck, Victoria Sastry, Shankar Systems and Control Multiagent Systems Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control 91B03, 91A68, 90B06, 90C27 The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports. Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that leverages the network flow structure. |
| title | Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach |
| topic | Systems and Control Multiagent Systems Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control 91B03, 91A68, 90B06, 90C27 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.18166 |