Designing Simple Mechanisms
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866929426844876800 |
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| author | Li, Shengwu |
| author_facet | Li, Shengwu |
| contents | Which mechanisms are simple to play? When is it easy for participants to see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible? I will start by explaining how and why economists came to ask these questions. Then I will discuss three recent answers, that capture different aspects of what makes a mechanism simple. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_18694 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Designing Simple Mechanisms Li, Shengwu Theoretical Economics Which mechanisms are simple to play? When is it easy for participants to see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible? I will start by explaining how and why economists came to ask these questions. Then I will discuss three recent answers, that capture different aspects of what makes a mechanism simple. |
| title | Designing Simple Mechanisms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.18694 |