Cover Image

Designing Simple Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Li, Shengwu
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Sequential Cursed Equilibrium
by: Cohen, Shani, et al.
Published: (2022)

Calibrated Mechanism Design
by: Doval, Laura, et al.
Published: (2025)

Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2026)

Mechanism Design by a Politician
by: Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Endogenous Perception
by: Balzer, Benjamin, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
by: Häfner, Samuel, et al.
Published: (2025)

Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Design: Consensus Planning Protocol Meets Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2026)

Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers: A Queueing Theory Approach
by: Li, Zihao, et al.
Published: (2026)

Simple Communication
by: Bizzotto, Jacopo, et al.
Published: (2025)

Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design
by: Yan, Eric
Published: (2024)

Allocating Positional Goods: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Xiao, Peiran
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle
by: Xiong, Siyang
Published: (2024)

Simple Models and Biased Forecasts
by: Molavi, Pooya
Published: (2022)

Simple Paired Combinatorial Assignment
by: Gao, Eric
Published: (2025)

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
by: Anunrojwong, Jerry, et al.
Published: (2022)

Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Dimitrov, Dinko, et al.
Published: (2025)

Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives
by: Augias, Victor, et al.
Published: (2023)

The Power of Simple Menus in Robust Selling Mechanisms
by: Wang, Shixin
Published: (2023)

Simple Proofs of the Variational and Multiple Priors Representations
by: Ball, Ian
Published: (2023)

Selling Multiple Items to a Unit-Demand Buyer via Automated Mechanism Design
by: Hashimoto, Kento, et al.
Published: (2025)

Statistical Mechanism Design: Robust Pricing, Estimation, and Inference
by: Gonçalves, Duarte, et al.
Published: (2024)

Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality
by: Li, Shangen
Published: (2024)

Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service
by: Bó, Inácio, et al.
Published: (2021)

Power and Freedom in Mechanisms
by: Basteck, Christian, et al.
Published: (2025)

Complete Exchange Mechanisms
by: Kitahara, Minoru, et al.
Published: (2025)

Visibly Fair Mechanisms
by: Bó, Inácio, et al.
Published: (2025)

Local Priority Mechanisms
by: Root, Joseph, et al.
Published: (2023)

Contextually Private Mechanisms
by: Haupt, Andreas, et al.
Published: (2021)

Self-Confirming Mechanisms
by: Feng, Zhiming, et al.
Published: (2026)

Strategically Analogous Mechanisms
by: Feffer, Joseph, et al.
Published: (2026)

Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange
by: Manjunath, Vikram, et al.
Published: (2025)

Signaling Design
by: Camboni, Matteo, et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimal Refund Mechanism with Consumer Learning
by: Lyu, Qianjun
Published: (2024)

Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
by: Root, Joseph, et al.
Published: (2020)

Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities
by: Giordano, Francesco
Published: (2026)

On the Dominance of Truth-Telling in Gradual Mechanisms
by: Wang, Wenqian, et al.
Published: (2025)

Lexicographic Robustness and the Efficiency of Optimal Mechanisms
by: Kambhampati, Ashwin
Published: (2026)

A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms
by: Grigoryan, Aram, et al.
Published: (2023)

Emergence of Homophily under Contextual Mechanisms
by: Weng, Jiaxing, et al.
Published: (2025)

Designing Social Learning
by: Smirnov, Aleksei, et al.
Published: (2024)