Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.19831 |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866913289592635392 |
|---|---|
| author | Brown, Doris E. M. Nadendla, Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Das, Sajal K. |
| author_facet | Brown, Doris E. M. Nadendla, Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Das, Sajal K. |
| contents | Stackelberg routing platforms (SRP) reduce congestion in one-shot traffic networks by proposing optimal route recommendations to selfish travelers. Traditionally, Stackelberg routing is cast as a partial control problem where a fraction of traveler flow complies with route recommendations, while the remaining respond as selfish travelers. In this paper, a novel Stackelberg routing framework is formulated where the agents exhibit \emph{probabilistic compliance} by accepting SRP's route recommendations with a \emph{trust} probability. A greedy \emph{\textbf{T}rust-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{S}tackelberg \textbf{R}outing} algorithm (in short, TASR) is proposed for SRP to compute unique path recommendations to each traveler flow with a unique demand. Simulation experiments are designed with random travel demands with diverse trust values on real road networks such as Sioux Falls, Chicago Sketch, and Sydney networks for both single-commodity and multi-commodity flows. The performance of TASR is compared with state-of-the-art Stackelberg routing methods in terms of traffic congestion and trust dynamics over repeated interaction between the SRP and the travelers. Results show that TASR improves network congestion without causing a significant reduction in trust towards the SRP, when compared to most well-known Stackelberg routing strategies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2403_19831 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | TASR: A Novel Trust-Aware Stackelberg Routing Algorithm to Mitigate Traffic Congestion Brown, Doris E. M. Nadendla, Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Das, Sajal K. Computer Science and Game Theory Stackelberg routing platforms (SRP) reduce congestion in one-shot traffic networks by proposing optimal route recommendations to selfish travelers. Traditionally, Stackelberg routing is cast as a partial control problem where a fraction of traveler flow complies with route recommendations, while the remaining respond as selfish travelers. In this paper, a novel Stackelberg routing framework is formulated where the agents exhibit \emph{probabilistic compliance} by accepting SRP's route recommendations with a \emph{trust} probability. A greedy \emph{\textbf{T}rust-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{S}tackelberg \textbf{R}outing} algorithm (in short, TASR) is proposed for SRP to compute unique path recommendations to each traveler flow with a unique demand. Simulation experiments are designed with random travel demands with diverse trust values on real road networks such as Sioux Falls, Chicago Sketch, and Sydney networks for both single-commodity and multi-commodity flows. The performance of TASR is compared with state-of-the-art Stackelberg routing methods in terms of traffic congestion and trust dynamics over repeated interaction between the SRP and the travelers. Results show that TASR improves network congestion without causing a significant reduction in trust towards the SRP, when compared to most well-known Stackelberg routing strategies. |
| title | TASR: A Novel Trust-Aware Stackelberg Routing Algorithm to Mitigate Traffic Congestion |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.19831 |