Policy Optimization finds Nash Equilibrium in Regularized General-Sum LQ Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Zaman, Muhammad Aneeq uz, Aggarwal, Shubham, Bastopcu, Melih, Başar, Tamer
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Zaman, Muhammad Aneeq uz
Aggarwal, Shubham
Bastopcu, Melih
Başar, Tamer
author_facet Zaman, Muhammad Aneeq uz
Aggarwal, Shubham
Bastopcu, Melih
Başar, Tamer
contents In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing relative entropy regularization on the Nash Equilibria (NE) of General-Sum $N$-agent games, revealing the fact that the NE of such games conform to linear Gaussian policies. Moreover, it delineates sufficient conditions, contingent upon the adequacy of entropy regularization, for the uniqueness of the NE within the game. As Policy Optimization serves as a foundational approach for Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques aimed at finding the NE, in this work we prove the linear convergence of a policy optimization algorithm which (subject to the adequacy of entropy regularization) is capable of provably attaining the NE. Furthermore, in scenarios where the entropy regularization proves insufficient, we present a $δ$-augmentation technique, which facilitates the achievement of an $ε$-NE within the game.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_00045
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Policy Optimization finds Nash Equilibrium in Regularized General-Sum LQ Games
Zaman, Muhammad Aneeq uz
Aggarwal, Shubham
Bastopcu, Melih
Başar, Tamer
Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing relative entropy regularization on the Nash Equilibria (NE) of General-Sum $N$-agent games, revealing the fact that the NE of such games conform to linear Gaussian policies. Moreover, it delineates sufficient conditions, contingent upon the adequacy of entropy regularization, for the uniqueness of the NE within the game. As Policy Optimization serves as a foundational approach for Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques aimed at finding the NE, in this work we prove the linear convergence of a policy optimization algorithm which (subject to the adequacy of entropy regularization) is capable of provably attaining the NE. Furthermore, in scenarios where the entropy regularization proves insufficient, we present a $δ$-augmentation technique, which facilitates the achievement of an $ε$-NE within the game.
title Policy Optimization finds Nash Equilibrium in Regularized General-Sum LQ Games
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.00045