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Prophet Inequalities with Cancellation Costs

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Ekbatani, Farbod, Niazadeh, Rad, Nuti, Pranav, Vondrak, Jan
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2024
Materias:	Data Structures and Algorithms Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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