Imitation dynamics and the replicator equation

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteur principal: Fontanari, José F.
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Fontanari, José F.
author_facet Fontanari, José F.
contents Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the central equation of this theory - the replicator equation - is the deterministic limit of a stochastic imitation (social learning) dynamics. Here we offer an alternative elementary proof of this result, which holds for the scenario where players compare their instantaneous (not average) payoffs to decide whether to maintain or change their strategies, and only more successful individuals can be imitated.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_00754
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Imitation dynamics and the replicator equation
Fontanari, José F.
Physics and Society
Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Populations and Evolution
Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the central equation of this theory - the replicator equation - is the deterministic limit of a stochastic imitation (social learning) dynamics. Here we offer an alternative elementary proof of this result, which holds for the scenario where players compare their instantaneous (not average) payoffs to decide whether to maintain or change their strategies, and only more successful individuals can be imitated.
title Imitation dynamics and the replicator equation
topic Physics and Society
Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Populations and Evolution
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.00754