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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.01404 |
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| _version_ | 1866929604665540608 |
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| author | Bubboloni, Daniela Gori, Michele Meo, Claudia |
| author_facet | Bubboloni, Daniela Gori, Michele Meo, Claudia |
| contents | We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of matchings to each preference profile; resoluteness, that is the capability to select a unique matching, and stability are important properties for a matching mechanism. The two versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm are resolute and stable matching mechanisms but they are unfair since they strongly favor one side of the market. We introduce a property for matching mechanisms that relates to fairness; such property, called symmetry, captures different levels of fairness and generalizes existing notions. We provide several possibility and impossibility results mainly involving the most general notion of symmetry, known as gender fairness, resoluteness, stability, weak Pareto optimality and minimal optimality. In particular, we prove that: resolute, gender fair matching mechanisms exist if and only if each side of the market consists of an odd number of agents; there exists no resolute, gender fair, minimally optimal matching mechanism. Those results are obtained by employing algebraic methods based on group theory, an approach not yet explored in matching theory. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_01404 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems Bubboloni, Daniela Gori, Michele Meo, Claudia Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Group Theory 20B05 We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of matchings to each preference profile; resoluteness, that is the capability to select a unique matching, and stability are important properties for a matching mechanism. The two versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm are resolute and stable matching mechanisms but they are unfair since they strongly favor one side of the market. We introduce a property for matching mechanisms that relates to fairness; such property, called symmetry, captures different levels of fairness and generalizes existing notions. We provide several possibility and impossibility results mainly involving the most general notion of symmetry, known as gender fairness, resoluteness, stability, weak Pareto optimality and minimal optimality. In particular, we prove that: resolute, gender fair matching mechanisms exist if and only if each side of the market consists of an odd number of agents; there exists no resolute, gender fair, minimally optimal matching mechanism. Those results are obtained by employing algebraic methods based on group theory, an approach not yet explored in matching theory. |
| title | Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Group Theory 20B05 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.01404 |