Understanding the Impact of Coalitions between EV Charging Stations
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Kudva, Sukanya Kulkarni, Kshitij Maheshwari, Chinmay Aswani, Anil Sastry, Shankar |
| author_facet | Kudva, Sukanya Kulkarni, Kshitij Maheshwari, Chinmay Aswani, Anil Sastry, Shankar |
| contents | The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) is driving the expansion of charging infrastructure globally. As charging stations become ubiquitous, their substantial electricity consumption can influence grid operation and electricity pricing. Naturally, \textit{some} groups of charging stations, which could be jointly operated by a company, may coordinate to decide their charging profile. While coordination among all charging stations is ideal, it is unclear if coordination of some charging stations is better than no coordination. In this paper, we analyze this intermediate regime between no and full coordination of charging stations. We model EV charging as a non-cooperative aggregative game, where each station's cost is determined by both monetary payments tied to reactive electricity prices on the grid and its sensitivity to deviations from a desired charging profile. We consider a solution concept that we call $\mathcal{C}$-Nash equilibrium, which is tied to a coalition $\mathcal{C}$ of charging stations coordinating to reduce their costs. We provide sufficient conditions, in terms of the demand and sensitivity of charging stations, to determine when independent (aka uncoordinated) operation of charging stations could result in lower overall costs to charging stations, coalition and charging stations outside the coalition. Somewhat counter to common intuition, we show numerical instances where allowing charging stations to operate independently is better than coordinating a subset of stations as a coalition. Jointly, these results provide operators of charging stations insights into how to coordinate their charging behavior, and open several research directions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_03919 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Understanding the Impact of Coalitions between EV Charging Stations Kudva, Sukanya Kulkarni, Kshitij Maheshwari, Chinmay Aswani, Anil Sastry, Shankar Optimization and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems Systems and Control 91A10, 91A80, 91B52, 91B54, 91B74, 93A16, 93A15 The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) is driving the expansion of charging infrastructure globally. As charging stations become ubiquitous, their substantial electricity consumption can influence grid operation and electricity pricing. Naturally, \textit{some} groups of charging stations, which could be jointly operated by a company, may coordinate to decide their charging profile. While coordination among all charging stations is ideal, it is unclear if coordination of some charging stations is better than no coordination. In this paper, we analyze this intermediate regime between no and full coordination of charging stations. We model EV charging as a non-cooperative aggregative game, where each station's cost is determined by both monetary payments tied to reactive electricity prices on the grid and its sensitivity to deviations from a desired charging profile. We consider a solution concept that we call $\mathcal{C}$-Nash equilibrium, which is tied to a coalition $\mathcal{C}$ of charging stations coordinating to reduce their costs. We provide sufficient conditions, in terms of the demand and sensitivity of charging stations, to determine when independent (aka uncoordinated) operation of charging stations could result in lower overall costs to charging stations, coalition and charging stations outside the coalition. Somewhat counter to common intuition, we show numerical instances where allowing charging stations to operate independently is better than coordinating a subset of stations as a coalition. Jointly, these results provide operators of charging stations insights into how to coordinate their charging behavior, and open several research directions. |
| title | Understanding the Impact of Coalitions between EV Charging Stations |
| topic | Optimization and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems Systems and Control 91A10, 91A80, 91B52, 91B54, 91B74, 93A16, 93A15 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.03919 |