Image de couverture de livre

Algorithmic Fairness and Social Welfare

Fuente: arXiv

Enregistré dans:

Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Liang, Annie, Lu, Jay
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

Documents similaires

Creative Ownership in the Age of AI
par: Liang, Annie, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
par: Geffner, Ivan, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Artificial Intelligence Clones
par: Liang, Annie
Publié: (2025)

The Value of Context: Human versus Black Box Evaluators
par: Iakovlev, Andrei, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Friend or Foe: Delegating to an AI Whose Alignment is Unknown
par: Fudenberg, Drew, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Fair Core Imputations for the Assignment Game: New Solution Concepts and Efficient Algorithms
par: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publié: (2024)

Stabilizing Welfare-Maximizing Decisions via Endogenous Transfers
par: Kavner, Joshua
Publié: (2026)

The Welfare Gap of Strategic Storage: Universal Bounds and Price Non-Linearity
par: Jiang, Zhile, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design
par: Fallah, Alireza, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes
par: Aziz, Haris, et autres
Publié: (2024)

On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules
par: Celine, Karen Frilya, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
par: Elkind, Edith, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Share-Based Fairness for Arbitrary Entitlements
par: Babaioff, Moshe, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Existence of Fair Resolute Voting Rules
par: Dhar, Manik, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences
par: Igarashi, Ayumi, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting
par: Ebadian, Soroush, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness
par: Finster, Simon, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching
par: Igarashi, Ayumi, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective?
par: Elmalem, Noga Klein, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited
par: Chakraborty, Mithun, et autres
Publié: (2021)

Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration
par: Carissimo, Cesare, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-Degenerate Valuations
par: Bismuth, Samuel, et autres
Publié: (2019)

Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting
par: Suzuki, Mashbat, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion
par: Hartline, Jason D., et autres
Publié: (2024)

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
par: Cai, Yang, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
par: Duetting, Paul, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Clarification of `Algorithmic Collusion without Threats'
par: Hartline, Jason
Publié: (2026)

Continuous Social Networks
par: Chitiva, Julián, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion, Refined: Testing Pessimistic Calibrated Regret
par: Hartline, Jason D., et autres
Publié: (2025)

Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
par: Brandt, Felix, et autres
Publié: (2024)

The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning
par: Arieli, Itai, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Nash equilibria of quasisupermodular games
par: Yu, Lu
Publié: (2024)

Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
par: Brandt, Felix, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey
par: Elkind, Edith, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions
par: Lederer, Patrick
Publié: (2025)

Truthful Cake Sharing
par: Bei, Xiaohui, et autres
Publié: (2021)

Post-AGI Economies: Autonomy and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
par: Perrier, Elija
Publié: (2026)

Welfare, Improvability, and Variance: A Principal-Agent Approach to Optimal Benchmark Item Aggregation
par: Haupt, Andreas, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Revisiting Fairness Impossibility with Endogenous Behavior
par: Penn, Elizabeth Maggie, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Local Coordination and the Geometry of Social Networks
par: Hutchcroft, Tom, et autres
Publié: (2026)