Direct Approach of Indefinite Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Cong, Wenyu, Shi, Jingtao
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Cong, Wenyu
Shi, Jingtao
author_facet Cong, Wenyu
Shi, Jingtao
contents This paper is concerned with an indefinite linear-quadratic mean field games of stochastic large-population system, where the individual diffusion coefficients can depend on both the state and the control of the agents. Moreover, the control weights in the cost functionals could be indefinite. A direct approach is used to derive the $ε$-Nash equilibrium strategy. First, we formally solving an $N$-player game problem within a vast and finite population setting. Subsequently, decoupling or reducing high-dimensional systems by introducing two Riccati equations explicitly yields centralized strategies, contingent on the state of a specific player and the average state of the population. As the population size $N$ goes infinity, the construction of decentralized strategies becomes feasible. Then, we demonstrated they are an $ε$-Nash equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_05166
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Direct Approach of Indefinite Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games
Cong, Wenyu
Shi, Jingtao
Optimization and Control
93E20, 60H10, 49K45, 49N70, 91A23
This paper is concerned with an indefinite linear-quadratic mean field games of stochastic large-population system, where the individual diffusion coefficients can depend on both the state and the control of the agents. Moreover, the control weights in the cost functionals could be indefinite. A direct approach is used to derive the $ε$-Nash equilibrium strategy. First, we formally solving an $N$-player game problem within a vast and finite population setting. Subsequently, decoupling or reducing high-dimensional systems by introducing two Riccati equations explicitly yields centralized strategies, contingent on the state of a specific player and the average state of the population. As the population size $N$ goes infinity, the construction of decentralized strategies becomes feasible. Then, we demonstrated they are an $ε$-Nash equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies.
title Direct Approach of Indefinite Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games
topic Optimization and Control
93E20, 60H10, 49K45, 49N70, 91A23
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.05166