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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.05546 |
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| _version_ | 1866911830676340736 |
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| author | Do, Jihwan Han, Lining Li, Xiaoxi |
| author_facet | Do, Jihwan Han, Lining Li, Xiaoxi |
| contents | This paper studies a stylized model of a monopoly data seller when information-sharing network exists among data buyers. We show that, if the buyers' prior information is sufficiently noisy, the optimal selling strategy is characterized by a maximum independent set, which is the largest set of buyers who do not have information-sharing link at all. In addition, the precision of the seller's data decreases in the number of information-sharing links among buyers, but it is higher than the socially efficient level of precision. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_05546 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Information Sale on Network Do, Jihwan Han, Lining Li, Xiaoxi Theoretical Economics This paper studies a stylized model of a monopoly data seller when information-sharing network exists among data buyers. We show that, if the buyers' prior information is sufficiently noisy, the optimal selling strategy is characterized by a maximum independent set, which is the largest set of buyers who do not have information-sharing link at all. In addition, the precision of the seller's data decreases in the number of information-sharing links among buyers, but it is higher than the socially efficient level of precision. |
| title | Information Sale on Network |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.05546 |