Exploiting CPU Clock Modulation for Covert Communication Channel
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910402688843776 |
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| author | Alam, Shariful Xiao, Jidong Eisty, Nasir U. |
| author_facet | Alam, Shariful Xiao, Jidong Eisty, Nasir U. |
| contents | Covert channel attacks represent a significant threat to system security, leveraging shared resources to clandestinely transmit information from highly secure systems, thereby violating the system's security policies. These attacks exploit shared resources as communication channels, necessitating resource partitioning and isolation techniques as countermeasures. However, mitigating attacks exploiting modern processors' hardware features to leak information is challenging because successful attacks can conceal the channel's existence. In this paper, we unveil a novel covert channel exploiting the duty cycle modulation feature of modern x86 processors. Specifically, we illustrate how two collaborating processes, a sender and a receiver can manipulate this feature to transmit sensitive information surreptitiously. Our live system implementation demonstrates that this covert channel can achieve a data transfer rate of up to 55.24 bits per second. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_05823 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Exploiting CPU Clock Modulation for Covert Communication Channel Alam, Shariful Xiao, Jidong Eisty, Nasir U. Cryptography and Security Covert channel attacks represent a significant threat to system security, leveraging shared resources to clandestinely transmit information from highly secure systems, thereby violating the system's security policies. These attacks exploit shared resources as communication channels, necessitating resource partitioning and isolation techniques as countermeasures. However, mitigating attacks exploiting modern processors' hardware features to leak information is challenging because successful attacks can conceal the channel's existence. In this paper, we unveil a novel covert channel exploiting the duty cycle modulation feature of modern x86 processors. Specifically, we illustrate how two collaborating processes, a sender and a receiver can manipulate this feature to transmit sensitive information surreptitiously. Our live system implementation demonstrates that this covert channel can achieve a data transfer rate of up to 55.24 bits per second. |
| title | Exploiting CPU Clock Modulation for Covert Communication Channel |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.05823 |