Assessing the Understandability and Acceptance of Attack-Defense Trees for Modelling Security Requirements
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Broccia, Giovanna ter Beek, Maurice H. Lafuente, Alberto Lluch Spoletini, Paola Ferrari, Alessio |
| author_facet | Broccia, Giovanna ter Beek, Maurice H. Lafuente, Alberto Lluch Spoletini, Paola Ferrari, Alessio |
| contents | Context and Motivation Attack-Defense Trees (ADTs) are a graphical notation used to model and assess security requirements. ADTs are widely popular, as they can facilitate communication between different stakeholders involved in system security evaluation, and they are formal enough to be verified, e.g., with model checkers. Question/Problem While the quality of this notation has been primarily assessed quantitatively, its understandability has never been evaluated despite being mentioned as a key factor for its success. Principal idea/Results In this paper, we conduct an experiment with 25 human subjects to assess the understandability and user acceptance of the ADT notation. The study focuses on performance-based variables and perception-based variables, with the aim of evaluating the relationship between these measures and how they might impact the practical use of the notation. The results confirm a good level of understandability of ADTs. Participants consider them useful, and they show intention to use them. Contribution This is the first study empirically supporting the understandability of ADTs, thereby contributing to the theory of security requirements engineering. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_06386 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Assessing the Understandability and Acceptance of Attack-Defense Trees for Modelling Security Requirements Broccia, Giovanna ter Beek, Maurice H. Lafuente, Alberto Lluch Spoletini, Paola Ferrari, Alessio Software Engineering Cryptography and Security D.2.1 Context and Motivation Attack-Defense Trees (ADTs) are a graphical notation used to model and assess security requirements. ADTs are widely popular, as they can facilitate communication between different stakeholders involved in system security evaluation, and they are formal enough to be verified, e.g., with model checkers. Question/Problem While the quality of this notation has been primarily assessed quantitatively, its understandability has never been evaluated despite being mentioned as a key factor for its success. Principal idea/Results In this paper, we conduct an experiment with 25 human subjects to assess the understandability and user acceptance of the ADT notation. The study focuses on performance-based variables and perception-based variables, with the aim of evaluating the relationship between these measures and how they might impact the practical use of the notation. The results confirm a good level of understandability of ADTs. Participants consider them useful, and they show intention to use them. Contribution This is the first study empirically supporting the understandability of ADTs, thereby contributing to the theory of security requirements engineering. |
| title | Assessing the Understandability and Acceptance of Attack-Defense Trees for Modelling Security Requirements |
| topic | Software Engineering Cryptography and Security D.2.1 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.06386 |