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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.06495 |
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| _version_ | 1866929749628026880 |
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| author | Wang, Wenhao Zhou, Lulu Yaish, Aviv Zhang, Fan Fisch, Ben Livshits, Benjamin |
| author_facet | Wang, Wenhao Zhou, Lulu Yaish, Aviv Zhang, Fan Fisch, Ben Livshits, Benjamin |
| contents | Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are computationally demanding to generate. Their importance for applications like ZK-Rollups has prompted some to outsource ZKP generation to a market of specialized provers. However, existing market designs either do not fit the ZKP setting or lack formal description and analysis.
In this work, we propose a formal ZKP market model that captures the interactions between users submitting ZKP tasks and provers competing to generate proofs. Building on this model, we introduce $Prooφ$, an auction-based ZKP market mechanism. We prove that $Prooφ$ is incentive compatible for users and provers, and budget balanced. We augment $Prooφ$ with system-level designs to address the practical challenges of our setting, such as Sybil attacks, misreporting of prover capacity, and collusion. We analyze our system-level designs and show how they can mitigate the various security concerns. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_06495 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | $Prooφ$: A ZKP Market Mechanism Wang, Wenhao Zhou, Lulu Yaish, Aviv Zhang, Fan Fisch, Ben Livshits, Benjamin Computer Science and Game Theory Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are computationally demanding to generate. Their importance for applications like ZK-Rollups has prompted some to outsource ZKP generation to a market of specialized provers. However, existing market designs either do not fit the ZKP setting or lack formal description and analysis. In this work, we propose a formal ZKP market model that captures the interactions between users submitting ZKP tasks and provers competing to generate proofs. Building on this model, we introduce $Prooφ$, an auction-based ZKP market mechanism. We prove that $Prooφ$ is incentive compatible for users and provers, and budget balanced. We augment $Prooφ$ with system-level designs to address the practical challenges of our setting, such as Sybil attacks, misreporting of prover capacity, and collusion. We analyze our system-level designs and show how they can mitigate the various security concerns. |
| title | $Prooφ$: A ZKP Market Mechanism |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.06495 |